section five, where I develop the suggestions from sections two and three with homonymy in the spotlight, and where I amend my Direct Reference and (especially) Millian takes on PT/MT accordingly.
PT and MT: Preliminaries
Consider the occurrence of 'Kennedy' in (2) there is a Kennedy in the house the Kennedy I know speaks French at least two Kennedys have been Catholic.
1
According to PT, (2) is evidence that 'Kennedy' is syntactically predicative, on a par with, say, '(is a) cat' (compare with 'there is a cat in the house', 'the cat I know speaks French', and 'at least two cats have been Catholic'). This parallelism is notoriously far from exceptionless, given that names at least superficially tolerate the absence of a determiner, as in the example cited above and repeated here:
(1) Kennedy was shot in Dallas (contrast with *'cat was shot in Dallas'). Since 'Kennedy' prima facie occurs predicatively in (2) but not in (1), an account of its seemingly dual behavior is imperative. Uncontroversially, the contrast cannot be dismissed as an accidental lexical ambiguity for 'Kennedy', and must be explainable in terms of systematic mechanisms applicable to names across the board. PT's solution in this respect invokes an unpronounced determiner, as in (1a) det kennedy was shot in Dallas for some determiner det yet to be discussed.
When it comes to 'kennedy', the predicate involved in the analysans for (1) and (2), an appeal to uniformity and pre-theoretic intuition typically motivates a popular development of PT, the Metalinguistic Theory of names (MT). The reasoning leading from PT to MT takes as its starting point the information presumably conveyed by (2), roughly paraphraseable as (2b) there is an individual named 'Kennedy' in the house the individual named 'Kennedy' whom I know speaks French at least two individuals named 'Kennedy' have been Catholic.
3
On the basis of this evidence, 'kennedy', the predicate allegedly corresponding to the occurrences of 'Kennedy' in (2), is interpreted along metalinguistic lines, as in '(individual) named 'Kennedy''. As a result, by uniformity, (1) is analyzed as (1b) det named 'Kennedy' was shot in Dallas, where a metalinguistically oriented predicate is flanked by the aforementioned unvoiced determiner det. 4 Intuitively, (1) has to do with a particular individual, at least partly in virtue of the occurrence of a name in that sentence-in some vague sense of 'having to do' yet to be clarified, and postponing until section four the discussion of scenarios in which many individuals 'share the same name'. Striving for a neutral terminology, I describe the relationships between that individual and the occurrence of 'Kennedy' in (1) in terms of designation. As long as (1a) and (1b) are assumed to provide a semantically perspicuous analysis of (1), it follows that PT and MT entail a certain explanation of the designation-relation-one which appeals to the semantic properties of the determiner-phrases 'det kennedy' and 'det named 'Kennedy'' occurring in the analysans.
The aim of the next two sections is that of exploring PT's and MT's commitments as theories of designation. For the sake of concision, I develop my considerations with an explicit focus on MT, but my conclusions are applicable mutatis mutandis to alternative versions of PT.
MT and Direct Reference
What then are the characteristic tenets of the theory of designation stemming from MT? MT partisans typically gesture towards descriptivist viewpoints as congenial to their approach, and they cite positions from the Direct Reference camp as their polemical targets. Given the popularity of anti-descriptivist theories of designation committed to Direct Reference, conclusions of this sort would indeed make MT a surprising addition to a long-standing debate in philosophical semantics.
5
Direct Reference appeals to the theoretical framework of propositional semantics, according to which a sentence S is associated (at a context c) with a structured proposition, in turn representable (given appropriate conventions) as an ntuple containing the contents (at c) appropriate for the components of S. For instance,
given a simple sentence S of the form Fa, the proposition associated with S at c is representable as the pair (3) <{a} c , {F} c > where, as usual, {e} is the character of e (a function from contexts to contents), and {e} c is its content at c.
6
According to the Direct Reference view of names, (1) is associated with a singular proposition: the propositional constituent for which 'Kennedy' is responsible 'is just the object itself' (Kaplan 1977: 494 independently of the evidence provided by their presumed predicative occurrences.
As I argue in the next section, a parallel strategy is available for a radically antidescriptivist take on names, the version of the singular-proposition approach I call
Millianism.

MT and Millianism
According to the Direct Reference twist on MT in (Det s ), the occurrence of 'Kennedy' 
where as usual k w is the circumstance determined by k. In plainer English: given a context k, a determiner-phrase det m F is associated with a constant character, the function which, for any context c as its argument, yields the unique individual in the extension of F at k's circumstances (as before, continuing to postpone issues of homonymy). In the case of the determiner-phrase of interest here: with respect to k, 'det m named 'Kennedy'' is associated with the constant character inevitably yielding whoever happens to be named 'Kennedy' at k w . As a result, the MT analysans of (1) 
His Name is My Name Too
Consider the contrast between (1) and its negation, that is, between the following two sentences: No obvious development of this ambiguity approach to homonymy seems to be consonant with MT. According to MT, the constructs in (7) would have to be analyzed along the lines of, respectively,
(det named 'Kennedy') 1 was shot in Dallas (det named 'Kennedy') 2 was not shot in Dallas.
Furthermore, since the dual semantic behavior of these determiner-phrases cannot plausibly be attributed to an ambiguity in det, appropriate disambiguation strategies would have to be mobilized for the predicate, as in (9) det (named 'Kennedy') 1 was shot in Dallas det (named 'Kennedy') 2 was not shot in Dallas.
Yet, a result of this kind would prove problematic when it comes to the evidence that provides the very impetus for predicativism, having to do with cases such as (2). For, according to the ambiguity view, the religious alliances of John Fitzgerald and Robert would no more justify the conclusion that, say, Indeed, according to MT, cases such as (10) are analyzed as (11) at least two individuals named 'Kennedy' were Catholic, and are thus actually true only if more than one individual may satisfy the condition of being named 'Kennedy' at our world. In this sense, the property provided by 'named n' (at c) must be understood in such a way that distinct individuals i and j may both belong in the extension it determines with respect to a given circumstance. If, by uniformity, a property of this sort is of relevance for the determiner-phrases involved in the analysis of the sentences in (6), it follows that utterances of these sentences may be interpreted correctly only if suitably different restrictions are imposed on the named-'Kennedy' condition-pre-theoretically speaking, restrictions that secure John
Fitzgerald in one case, and Robert in the other. In semantic terms, this idea corresponds to the notion that the determiner-phrases occurring in the MT analyses of (6) must be evaluated with respect to distinct parameters. A natural option in this respect, one of particular interests due to its repercussions when it comes to (Det s ) and (Det m ), identifies the parameters in question as elements of context-say, as dedicated co-ordinates c n , informally c's 'naming convention'.
The idea of a 'naming convention' notoriously deserves independent study. 17 Still, from this essay's viewpoint, the details pertaining to the sort of linguistic and extra-linguistic regularities eventually formalizable in terms of c n may safely be left aside. For concreteness' sake, I proceed without further ado with an understanding of c n as a 'disambiguating' restriction-say, a function such that, for any name n and circumstance w, |c n (named n (w))| = 1, where named n (w) is the set of individuals who are named n at w. 18 So, informally, John Fitzgerald is the unique actual individual who is named 'Kennedy' according to a certain naming convention f 1 , and
Robert is the unique actual individual who is named 'Kennedy' according to a distinct naming convention f 2 .
According to this context-sensitive alternative to the ambiguity view, then, the aforementioned utterances of the sentences in (6) are understood as occurrences of one and the same expression on different occasions-in particular, on occasions representable by contexts which differ with respect to their naming-convention parameters. I devote the next section to the exploration of how this sort of contextsensitivity may be reflected at the level of semantic analysis, with particular attention to its relationships with the treatments of det introduced in sections two and three. In particular, after a few comments on the indexicalist take that naturally accompanies (Det s ), I pause on an account of context-sensitivity consonant with the double-context paradigm developed for (Det m ), indirectly making good on my pledge to explain its independent philosophical motivation.
Homonymy, Direct Reference, and Millianism
Given the standard semantic treatment adopted in section two (as opposed to the unorthodox double-context framework from section three), the notion that certain expressions are context-sensitive is immediately translatable in terms of non-constant characters. In this framework, then, the determiner-phrase which MT associates with the occurrence of 'Kennedy' in (1) may designate different individuals at different contexts-in particular, at contexts that differ for their naming-convention. 19 Here as in section two, this option may be developed along straightforwardly descriptivist lines, but may also be approached from a viewpoint sympathetic to Direct Reference, as in the following development of (Det s ): by an adequate semantic theory with expressions devoted to designating i, rather than anybody else.
22
The picture sketched in the foregoing paragraphs is admittedly rough and in dire need of development. Still, the point here is not the discussion of the relationships between pre-semantic and properly semantic questions, given viewpoints suitable for a theory of designation. After all, if the predicativist evidence summarized in section one is on the right track, designation does not exhaust a name's genuinely semantic behavior: proper names, so the story goes, are also employable in non-designative roles, as in (2). Since these example are presumably worthy of semantic consideration, it follows that the faith of generic name-types, such as the common appellation for John Fitzgerald and Robert, may not be relegated to the pre-semantic limbo. As a result, it follows that the distinction between 'Kennedy' as a name for John Fitzgerald and 'Kennedy' as a name for Robert must be the responsibility of some parameter 'internal' to the semantic machinery put in motion for their interpretation.
Given the Millian notion that proper names are endowed with a constant character, the idea of a semantic parameter responsible for the distinction between different uses of 'Kennedy' must inevitably end up with the recognition that context plays a role over and above (figuratively, 'before') its ability to serve as argument for character-indeed, a role responsible for the assignment of a character to a nametype, as it is being used on a particular occasion. What a Millian theory concerned solely with the details of the designation relation could afford to relegate to presemantic context is thus now naturally recognized as a distinct semantic function for context, one naturally formalizable in terms of the distinction between dubbing contexts and interpreting contexts, as suggested in section three. 
Conclusion
The main aim of this essay has been that of arguing that PT and MT do not provide momentous evidence in favor of this or that theory of designation-even under the assumption of PT/MT's (possibly controversial) appeals to intuition and uniformity.
In sections two and three, I defended this conclusion by suggesting developments of 2011) . 3 The inevitability of metalinguistic paraphrases has been challenged by Boer and Jeshion (Boer 1975 , Jeshion 2013a , 2013b , and 2013c ), who present an impressive variety of examples arguably parallel to (2), but which do not elicit metalinguistic interpretations. 4 For careful critical discussions of this appeal to uniformity see in particular Jeshion 2013a and 2013b, Leckie 2013, and Rami 2013 . As announced, I leave these worries aside (and those of the sort mentioned in the preceding footnote) merely for the argument's sake. Many details in (1b) are worthy of independent study. Defenders of MT devote a great deal of attention to the relation mentioned in (1b), occasionally distinguishing between 'being named', 'bearing a name', and 'being called' (see Matushansky 2008 , Fara 2011 and, from neighbouring metalinguistic descriptivist camps, Bach 2002 and Geurts 1997) . To my knowledge, remarkably less effort is devoted to the study of that relation's second relatum, the quotational expression. Yet, none of these complications are of immediate importance here, my considerations being rephraseable according to any reasonable understanding of 'being named' and of mentioning devices. 5 The most explicit statements in this respect come from Matushansky, according to whom PT/MT supports a descriptivist stance, in some wide sense of descriptivism supposed to include Frege 1892 , Russell 1911 , Searle 1958 , Kneale 1962 , Burge 1973 , Katz 1977 , 1994 , and Bach 1981 (Matushansky 2008 . 6 The notation and terminology are borrowed from Kaplan 1977 . For developments, see Salmon 1986 and Soames 1987 ; for general philosophical comments, see also King 2007. 7 In the sense of 'circumstance' from Kaplan 1977 , hereinafter for simplicity's sake merely possible worlds. So, leaving aside issues of tense and pretty much any other detail ensuing from the internal composition of this verb-phrase, {was shot in Dallas} c (w) is the set of individuals who bear shot at w. 8 The (simplified) propositional structure presented in (5) is obviously inspired by the classic treatment informally put forth by Kaplan (Kaplan 1977 and 1989 10 If the present tense in '(is an individual) named 'Kennedy'' is treated according to a simple-minded indexical model, {named 'Kennedy'} c is the property of being named 'Kennedy' at c t , the context's time, so that {named 'Kennedy'} c (c w ) is the set of individuals who are named 'Kennedy' at c t and c w . Issues of tense and temporal dependence are ignored throughout this essay-the point of this footnote being rather than of stressing the two-fold role of c in the identification of {F} c (c w ), first as a parameter for the interpretation of indexicality, then as a co-ordinate relevant from the viewpoint of contingency (see Kaplan 1977 and Lewis 1980) . 11 The strategy in (Det s ) is reminiscent of Kaplan conception of 'dthat' as a device of direct reference, see Kaplan 1977 and 1989 . These similarities are particularly intriguing if approached from the viewpoint of certain Kaplan-inspired views of complex demonstratives, according to which the material flanking 'that' compositionally determines the character of 'that F' (see Borg 2000 and Salmon 2002) . A suggestion of this sort inevitably brings to mind what is generally cited as the original source of the predicative stance on proper names, Tyler Burge's 'Reference and Proper Names' (Burge 1973) . According to Burge, the determiner involved in the analysis of designative occurrences of proper names is a demonstrative 'that', as in 'that individual named 'Kennedy''. Noteworthy in this respect is the fact that Burge not only refrains from any attack against the Direct Reference movement, but in fact explicitly endorses at least some of its distinctive tenets (Grice's 'Vacuous Names', as far as I can tell, is the only source Burge indicates as incompatible with his approach to names; see Burge 1973 : 428 fn. 4 and 434 fn.13; 426 footnote 3). 12 In particular, at least some descriptivist sources sympathetically mentioned by PT partisans take issue with Kripke-style arguments for rigidity, and propose ingenious examples apparently motivating a flaccid approach to proper names (Bach 2002 , Geurts 1997 . Uncontroversially, these examples need to be assessed in their own right, with no significant repercussions for the semantic implications of PT and MT. 13 This is so, of course, even continuing to disregard the possibly indexical features introduced by tense in '(is an individual) named 'Kennedy''. 14 A referee for this journal calls my attention to some points of contact between this strategy and the idea of a 'switcher' in Glüer and Pagin 2006. The analogies are intriguing, possibly modulo certain delicate issues having to do with the comparison of different semantic frameworks (Glüer and Pagin 2006 puts forth a model-theoretic approach grounded on the idea of an 'actualist evaluation' for individual constants, in turn applicable to the interpretation of occurrences of proper names within the scope of certain operators). 15 The reiteration of a methodological caveat implicit in these considerations may be appropriate at this stage: if what follows is on the right track, my two-context proposal may be approached as a relatively natural formalization of certain prima facie plausible ideas. As a referee for this journal correctly points out, this much is not equivalent to the guarantee that my framework will be unproblematically generalizable and adaptable to larger fragments. This worry is legitimate, but puts a relatively heavy burden on my opponent's shoulders: that of identifying inconsistent or otherwise intolerable consequences of what appears as a relatively minimal, though
